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III. INTRODUCTION 
In a reply brief replete with misstatements and distortions of the record on 
appeal, appellants Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), Thomas E. Mower and Leslie D. Mower 
seek to enlist this Court in their campaign to evade Macris & Associates, Inc.'s 
("Macris") valid claims and judgment. In previous litigation between Macris and 
Neways' predecessor, Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), Macris asserted claims for a 
1991 breach of a 1989 Autoqualification Agreement that obligated Images to pay 
Macris a portion of the monthly sales profits from Images' multilevel marketing 
business. What Neways and the Mowers are desperate to keep from this Court is their 
conduct during that litigation (the "Images action") which necessitated this lawsuit (the 
"Neways action"). Neways and the Mowers even resort to distorting and baldly 
misstating the record to conceal their actions. 
The record, however, demonstrates the following facts which Neways and the 
Mowers want to disavow. Relying on that portion of the Autoqualification Agreement 
which provided that the agreement was to endure throughout the life of Images as long 
as Macris is active in promoting Images and Images' products, the Mowers formed 
Neways in August of 1992 with Images' officers, directors and shareholders, (R. at 11, 
31, 173, 292, 323-24) and on the eve of the first trial setting, the newly formed Neways 
succeeded to Images' multilevel marketing business, acquiring substantially all of the 
assets, including all tangible assets and inventory of Images. (R. at 10, 35, 173, 259, 
263.) All of the distributors of the multilevel marketing business, with the exception of 
Macris, were invited to become distributors under Neways with the same rank and 
position. (R. at 35, 171, 239-40, 291, 323-24.) Neways carried on the same business 
as Images, using the same facilities, employees, equipment, furnishings, and product 
formulations that Images had used before the transfer. (R. at 291, 323-24.) Of course, 
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after Neways was formed and succeeded to Images' multilevel marketing business, 
every effort was made during the Images action to deny any relationship between 
Images and Neways, even though in reality Neways and Images were essentially the 
same entity. (R. at 262.) Images and Neways were merely shells through which the 
multilevel marketing business was passed to evade liability to Macris. 
This conduct which Neways and the Mowers now disingenuously deny demands 
that the doctrine of res judicata be held inapplicable to Macris' causes of action. 
Neways was never a party in the Images action, and because Macris did not have a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego 
claims in that case, Neways must not be held to have been in privity with Images. 
Furthermore, the claims Macris asserts in this action against Neways and the Mowers 
are factually, chronologically, transactional^, and legally unrelated to the breach of 
contract claims it asserted during the Images action. In addition, Macris fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims arose well after the commencement of 
the Images action and after any reasonable point in that litigation at which Macris could 
and should have asserted them. Moreover, it is Neways and the Mowers' conduct 
during the Images action that denied Macris its day in court and forced the parties into a 
seventh year of litigation. Neways and the Mowers' arguments to the contrary are an 
affront and are in callous disregard for their conduct as evidenced by the 
uncontroverted factual record. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. NEWAYS AND THE MOWERS MISSTATE THE RECORD AND IMPROPERLY 
CONTRIVE FACTS REGARDING NEWAYS' SUCCESSION TO IMAGES' 
MULTILEVEL MARKETING BUSINESS AND THE COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS DURING THE IMAGES ACTION. 
In apparent recognition that the existing record on appeal does not support their 
2 
arguments, Neways and the Mowers resort to misstating and mischaracterizing the 
record. Neways and the Mowers major factual misstatements are in the areas of 
Neways' succession to Images' multilevel marketing business and the course of 
proceedings during the Images action. 
Neways and the Mowers misstate the record with respect to Neways' succession 
to Images' multilevel marketing business. First, Neways and the Mowers make the 
novel assertion that Images' liability was transferred to Images' alleged successor 
corporation, Eclat, Inc. ("Eclat"). (Reply Brief of Appellant at 1, 24.) In support of this 
assertion, which Neways and the Mowers admit was not made to the trial court in 
connection with the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, (id at 24) Neways 
and the Mowers represent that "the pleadings show that the parties agreed Eclat was 
Images' true successor" because Macris' Complaint alleges that "Eclat was formerly 
known as Images." (jdL (citing R. at 11, 174).) Macris' Complaint, however, does not 
state that Eclat was formerly known as Images, but rather states that Eclat was merely 
another name for Images: "Eclat, Inc. f/k/a Images International, Inc. a/k/a Images & 
Attitude, Inc. ("Images") is a Utah corporation." (R. at 11 (emphasis added).) This is 
what Neways and the Mowers admitted in their Amended Answer. (R. at 174.) Even if 
Eclat was alleged to be formerly known as Images, that does not mean, in and of itself, 
that Eclat is Images' successor. Furthermore, Neways and the Mowers' absurd 
argument that Macris should have conducted discovery into "Eclat's successorship" 
must not excuse their failure to bring it to the attention of the trial court. Schaer v. 
State. 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983). 
Neways and the Mowers also contend that Neways does not use the same 
facilities, employees, distributorships, and health and beauty product formulations that 
were used by Images before Neways' succession to the multilevel marketing business. 
3 
(Reply Brief of Appellant at 1, 23.) This contention is also made too late. Neways and 
the Mowers failed to controvert these facts to the trial court. (R. at 291, 323-24.) Thus, 
under Rule 4-501 (2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Neways and the 
Mowers must be deemed to have admitted these facts. Furthermore, Neways and the 
Mowers may not raise a factual issue for the first time on appeal. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 
1342. 
In addition, Neways and the Mowers assert, also for the first time on appeal, that 
many of Images' distributors would not join Neways, causing many former Images' 
distributors to not retain their same rank and position in Neways. (Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 2, 23.) Not only is this assertion made too late, but it is also irrelevant. 
The facts which demonstrate that Neways is a mere continuation of Images and that 
Neways succeeded to Images' multilevel marketing business to evade liability to Macris 
include that all of Images' distributors, with the glaring exception of Macris, were invited 
to become Neways'distributors. (R. at 35, 171,239-40,291,323-24.) The fact that 
some of Images' distributors declined the invitation is not only understandable in light of 
the shell game Neways and the Mowers were perpetrating, it is also irrelevant. 
Neways and the Mowers also misstate the record with respect to the course of 
proceedings of the Images action. First, Neways and the Mowers represent that two 
pleadings were filed in the Images action after Neways succeeded to Images' multilevel 
marketing business on September 1, 1992. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 
19, 21, 22, 24 and addendum). Nowhere in the record is such representation 
supported. Therefore, these representations and Neways and the Mowers' arguments 
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relating to such pleadings must not be considered.1 Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1988); Territorial S&L Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 455 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The portions of the record which Neways and the Mowers cite do not support 
their contentions regarding two additional pleadings in the Images action. Neways and 
the Mowers cite to Record pages 1-12, 227-28, 273-79, 323, 351 and 507, at pp. 12, 14 
and 15. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 19 and 22.) Neither these portions 
of the record nor any other portion present evidence that two pleadings were filed in the 
Images action after September 1, 1992. Furthermore, the record contains not even a 
whisper of a pleading filed by Macris in the Images action after September 1, 1992. 
The only mention in the record of a pleading filed in the Images action after 
September 1, 1992 was by Neways and the Mowers' attorney during oral argument at 
the January 22, 1997 hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment. (R. at 
507, p. 15.) The only pleading mentioned, however, was Neways and Thomas Mowers' 
amended counterclaim and third party complaint. (R. at 507, p. 15.) Moreover, mere 
argument is no substitute for evidence. As this Court previously ruled, "[counsel's 
recollection of the course of proceedings is no substitute for a record of those 
1
 On July 14, 1998, Neways and the Mowers, recognizing that the representations and arguments in their 
Reply Brief relating to two additional pleadings from the Images action were not supported by the record, 
filed its Motion to Supplement Record with copies of the two pleadings. On July 27, 1998, Macris filed a 
Motion to Strike the Addendum to the Reply Brief of Appellant and Statement of Facts and Arguments 
based on Documents in Such Addendum and a memorandum in support of its motion and in opposition to 
Neways and the Mowers' Motion to Supplement the Record. As stated in Macris' memorandum, Neways 
and the Mowers cannot supplement the record with new material never introduced in the trial court. State 
v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478-79 n.17 (Utah 1990); Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 
1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Territorial S&L Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Conder 
v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In lieu of repeating all of the 
points and authorities set forth in Macris' memorandum here, Macris incorporates such points and 
authorities as well as those set forth in Macris' Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike the 
Addendum to the Reply Brief of Appellant and Statements of Fact and Arguments Based on Documents in 
such Addendum. 
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proceedings." Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359. Similarly, other courts have held that 
arguments of counsel cannot be considered as evidence in support of a fact contended 
on appeal. Kenvon v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 836 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1992); Economy Carpets Mfg. and Distr., Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, Inc.. 319 So. 2d 783, 786 (La. 1975); A Minor v. State. 454 P.2d 
895, 896 (Nev. 1969); Town of Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 126 N.W.2d 567, 
567 (Wis. 1964) (per curiam). Neways and the Mowers' statements of fact and 
arguments which refer or relate to pleadings filed in the Images action after 
September 1, 1992, must therefore be disregarded. 
Neways and the Mowers also assert that during the (mages action, "Macris' 
counsel spent three days at Neways' legal counsel's office reviewing Neways' financial 
documentation." (Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, 12, 16 and 19.) The record contains 
absolutely no evidence that such a review occurred. The portions of the record which 
Neways and the Mowers cite, Record pages 227, 273-79 and 507, pp. 12, 14 and 15, 
do not support their assertions. With the exception of Record page 507 at page 14, 
none of these pages contain the slightest hint that Macris' counsel spent three days at 
the offices of Neways' counsel reviewing Neways' financial information. 
The only portion of the record that alleges such a review is page 14 of the 
hearing transcript which recorded the oral argument of Neways' counsel. (R. at 507, 
p. 14.) As stated above, however, argument cannot substitute for evidence in support 
of an alleged fact on appeal. This is especially inappropriate considering that all facts 
and inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to Macris. Masters v. Worslev, 
777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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In fact, the evidence submitted to the trial court contradicts Neways and the 
Mowers' unsubstantiated assertions. The only evidence regarding the information 
Images allowed Macris to review during the Images action was information showing 
monthly sales figures through August 31, 1992, the date on which Images claimed that 
it no longer operated the multilevel marketing business and was no longer liable under 
the Autoqualification Agreement. (R. at 262.) Contrary to Neways and the Mowers' 
baseless assertions, "Images never produced any information from Neways." (R. at 
262.) 
B. MAORIS' FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ALTER 
EGO CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
JUDICATA BECAUSE NEWAYS WAS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH IMAGES. 
Neways and the Mowers argue, and the trial court to a great extent agreed, that 
Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims are precluded by a 
judgment in its favor on its breach of contract claims in the Images action. "In order for 
res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their privies and also 
the same cause of action." Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978). 
One of the reasons that res judicata cannot apply is that the defendants in this action, 
with the exception of Thomas Mower, were not parties in the Images action. 
Furthermore, and contrary to Neways and the Mowers' arguments and the trial court's 
conclusion, Neways was not in privity with Images. 
As discussed in the Brief of Cross-Appellant Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Brief of 
Cross-Appellant"), Utah law requires that for a nonparty to take advantage of a 
judgment in favor of a claimant whose later claims are sought to be precluded, the 
claimant must have had its day in court on the merits of its claims against the nonparty 
even though the nonparty was not present. (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 32-37.) This 
rule is mandated by the fairness and due process of law concepts that underlie and 
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permeate the identity of parties or privity requirement of res judicata. International 
Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979); 18 Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448 (1982). In the Images action, Macris did not 
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and 
alter ego claims. Litigation of these claims requires the presence of the transferee, the 
successor and the alter ego, Neways. Because Macris has not had its day in court with 
respect to these claims, Neways must not be held to be in privity with Images. 
This Court must not be swayed by the arguments of Neways and the Mowers 
who have, since August and September of 1992, endeavored to deprive Macris of a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate its valid claims.2 Neways and the Mowers repeat the 
argument they made in their opening brief that if Neways is liable as a successor to 
Images, it would necessarily be in privity with Images. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 7.) 
For this argument, Neways and the Mowers rely on the following statement in Searle 
Brothers v. Searle: 
The legal definition of a person in privity with another is a person 
so identified in interest with another that he represents the same 
legal right. This includes a mutual or successive relationship to 
rights in property. 
Searle, 588 P.2d at 698. Neways and the Mowers seek to expand the scope of the last 
quoted sentence to the point of absurdity. The Searle court did not state or intend that 
in all cases, parties involved in a successive relationship to property rights with each 
2
 Neways and the Mowers qualify their privity arguments with a disclaimer which should compel this Court 
to find that Neways was not in privity with Images. Neways and the Mowers assert that "when Neways 
argues that it is Images' privity, it is only for purposes of this appeal." (Reply Brief of Appellant at 3 n.1.) 
Apparently, outside this appeal, Neways and the Mowers desire to deny that Neways is in privity with 
Images, much like they denied any relationship between Images and Neways during the Images action. 
(R. at 262.) Neways and the Mowers' disclaimer, in and of itself, should persuade the Court to hold that 
Neways was not in privity with Images. If Neways and the Mowers, who bear the burden of proving that 
Neways and Images are in privity and against whom the facts of this case must be viewed, feel the need 
to disclaim a privity relationship for purposes outside this appeal, this Court should reject such a 
relationship for purposes of this appeal. 
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other will be deemed to be in privity for res judicata purposes. Such a holding would be 
contrary to its numerous directions that the privity concept be applied with an eye 
towards ensuring that a party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its claims. 
Dunfield, 599 P.2d at 517; Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 
1985); Ruffinenqo v. Miller 579 P.2d 342, 344 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the Searle Brothers v. Searle court did not need to go this far, as the 
facts of that case demonstrate. Searle Brothers v. Searle involved a dispute regarding 
interests in property known as the "Slaugh House." Searle, 588 P.2d at 690-91. In a 
prior divorce action, the Slaugh House was awarded to Edlean Searle and not Woodey 
Searle. hL at 690. A later action was brought by Woodey's sons who claimed an 
undivided one-half interest in the Slaugh House. \_± The trial court dismissed the 
action on grounds of res judicata. kL In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that Woodey's sons were not in privity with Woodey because their interest 
in the Slaugh House was neither mutual nor successive to Woodey's interests. kL at 
691. 
The court's privity analysis in Searle was wholly consistent with the overarching 
requirement that Woodey's sons be given a full and fair opportunity to litigate their 
claims. If Woodey's sons succeeded to the same property interests as Woodey, 
treating them as in privity with Woodey would be proper because Woodey could 
transfer no greater interest than he had. McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 456-57, 
201 P.2d 288, 295-96 (1948). Furthermore, binding Woodey's sons would be justified 
because "[t]o deny preclusion would be to deny the victor any assurance of repose and 
expose every judgment to defeat by simple conveyance." 18 Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4462 (1981). 
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In any event, to the extent that the Searle Brothers v. Searle court in one 
sentence stated that, in all cases, parties succeeding to property interests are in privity 
with their predecessors for res judicata purposes, that sentence is dictum and should 
not be followed. 
An example illustrates the unfairness that would result if the Searle court's 
statement on which Neways and the Mowers rely was expanded in the manner they 
advance. The following fact scenario is presented in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments to illustrate the rule that the rendition of a judgment against one person 
liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have against 
another person who may be liable therefor: 
A is the payee of note for $1,000 executed jointly by B and C. In 
an action by A against B on the note, C is not joined as a party. B 
defends on the ground that the obligation was paid, but the court 
finds that payment was made only to the extent of $300 and 
enters judgment for A for $700. A may maintain an action against 
C on the note but his recovery is limited to $700. 
Restatement (Second) Judgments § 49 cmt. b., illus. 3 (1982). Under the approach 
advocated by Neways and the Mowers, if C happened to have succeeded to property 
owned by B, C and B would be in privity. Because the claim against C would be the 
same as the claim against B, and because the first action ended in a final judgment, A 
would be precluded by res judicata from suing C. Not only would this result be logically 
unjustifiable and unnecessary to achieve the goals of the res judicata doctrine, but it 
would be patently unfair. Even though C is just as liable to A as B, A is denied a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate its claim against C. 
The other authorities cited by Neways and the Mowers in support of their 
argument that parties succeeding to property interests are in all cases in privity with 
their predecessors do not avail them. (Reply Brief at 7.) To the contrary, those 
authorities actually refute their approach. Nowhere in State in Interest of T.J., 945 P.2d 
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158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), did this Court state that persons in privity with each 
other includes persons having a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property. 
Instead, this Court reaffirmed the overarching policy of the identity of parties or privity 
requirement that parties be afforded "fair opportunities] to litigate the issues." k i at 
163. Furthermore, rather than ascertaining whether the parties alleged to be in privity 
had mutual or successive relationships to rights in property, this Court stated that the 
"ability to control representation of rights is 'necessary to fulfill [the] function of privity to 
provide a day in court."' \± (quoting State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Ruscetta, 742 
P.2d 114, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Golden State Bottling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 414 U.S. 168 
(1973), and Section 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments do provide that a 
successor in interest of property may be in privity with the transferor, but only if the 
transferred property was the subject of the action in which the transferor was a party. 
Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 179 ("Persons acquiring an interest in property 
that is a subject of litigation are bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a subsequent 
judgment. . . ." (emphasis added)); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982) 
("A successor in interest of property that is the subject of a pending action to which his 
transferor is a party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata 
to the same extent as his transferor. . . ." (emphasis added)). As discussed above, the 
privity analysis mentioned in Golden State Bottling Co. and Section 44 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments comports with the overarching concept of fairness 
if applied in the context of litigation involving property interests. However, if property 
interests are not involved in the prior action, it would deprive a litigant of his day in court 
to treat the property interests as in any way pertinent to the privity determination. 
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C. MAORIS' FRAUDULENT TRANSFER. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND ALTER 
EGO CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA BECAUSE THESE 
CLAIMS ARE NOT THE SAME OR PART OF THE SAME CAUSES OF 
ACTION ON WHICH MACRIS PREVAILED IN THE IMAGES ACTION. 
Neways and the Mowers now recognize that M[b]efore a court can decide if a 
party 'could have and should have' included a claim [in a previous action], [the party 
asserting the res judicata defense] 'must first overcome the threshold determination of 
whether the claims, demands or causes of action of both cases are the same.'" (Reply 
Brief of Appellant at 9 (quoting Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 n.2 (Utah 1983).) 
Macris' claims in this case are different from its claims in the Images action because 
(a) they rest on a different state of facts; (b) they relate to completely different time 
periods; (c) they arise out of completely different transactions; (d) they rely on 
completely different rights; (e) they seek redress for completely different wrongs; (f) a 
judgment in the Neways action will not impair rights or interests established in Images 
action; and (g) Macris' fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims could 
not have been asserted in the Images action because such claims required the 
presence of the transferee, the successor and the alter ego, Neways. 
Neways and the Mowers argue that various tests used to determine if a later 
claim is the same as a previous claim favor a finding that the claims in the Images 
action are the same as the claims in the Neways action. Application of these tests, 
however, shows the exact opposite. (See Brief of Cross-Appellant at 19-25.) In their 
application of these tests, Neways and the Mowers rely on the same contentions for 
each. These contentions are (1) their mantra that Macris' claims in this action arose 
from Images' 1991 breach of the Autoqualification Agreement; (2) the facts, proof and 
evidence used to obtain damages in the Images action will be used to prove damages 
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in the Newavs action; (3) Macris had a full and fair opportunity to obtain all of its 
damages in the Images action; and (4) Macris had full knowledge of its fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability and alter ego claims. Each of these contentions is meritless. 
1. Macris' Fraudulent Transfer, Successor Liability and Aiter Ego 
Claims Arose Out of the August 1992 Formation of Newavs and 
Images' September 1,1992 Transfer of Its Assets to Newavs. 
Contrary to Neways and the Mowers much repeated slogan, Macris' claims in the 
Newavs action did not arise out of the 1989 execution and Images' 1991 breach of the 
Autoqualification Agreement. (Reply Brief at 4, 11, 12, 14, 17.) Macris'claims in this 
action rest on different facts, different time periods, different transactions, different 
evidence, different rights, different wrongs, and the actions of different parties than its 
claims in the Images action. What Neways and the Mowers want this Court to ignore is 
that Macris' claims in this action arose out of the formation of Neways in August of 1992 
and Images' transfer of its assets, including the multilevel marketing business, to the 
newly formed corporation on September 1, 1992, the eve of the first trial setting in the 
Images action. Whereas the Images action dealt with whether the Autoqualification 
Agreement was valid and whether Images unjustifiably and inexcusably breached that 
agreement, the Newavs action will deal with the formation of Neways, the relationship 
between Images and Neways, the circumstances surrounding Images' transfer of its 
multilevel marketing business and other assets to Neways, and Neways' operation of 
the multilevel marketing business. As Neways and the Mowers admitted during the 
hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the Autoqualification Agreement 
won't be before this Court. The issue that will be before this Court 
is by virtue of corporate reorganizations, transfers for 
consideration!,] whether or not we, Neways, has [sic] assumed 
[liability] by virtue of the fraudulent conveyance statute, or whether 
or not it's the same entity by virtue of some common law theories. 
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(R. at 507, pp. 23-24.) 
Neways and the Mowers argue that Macris' claims in this action arose out of the 
1991 breach of the Autoqualification Agreement because in this case, Macris seeks the 
same damages it sought in the Images action. [Reply Brief of Appellant at 4, 11, 12, 
14, 17.) Macris, however, is not seeking the damages arising from Images' breach of 
the Autoqualification Agreement that it sought in the Images action. Again, Neways 
and the Mowers refuse to acknowledge Neways' formation with insiders of Images and 
succession to Images' multilevel marketing business and other assets. It is this conduct 
that gives rise to the damages Macris seeks in this case. (R. at 1-12.) In addition, 
these damages include punitive damages which Macris could not have obtained on its 
breach of contract claims in the Images action. 
In any event, the fact that Macris may seek some of the damages it would have 
received in the Images action but for Neways and the Mowers' fraudulent conduct is not 
determinative. First, Macris' claims in this action are different in every conceivable way 
from its claims in the images action. In addition, "where the unsuccessful party has 
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by 
his opponent, . . . a new suit may be sustained " Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 
N A , 801 P.2d 144, 148-49 (Utah 1990): see also Doe v. Allied-Signal. Inc.. 985 F.2d 
908, 914 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A] critical piece of the puzzle [giving rise to plaintiffs later 
asserted claims] was [defendant's] charge of tactics during the lawsuit. Without this 
information, [plaintiff] could not have known that she had a claim."); Estate of Covington 
v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert, denied. 910 P.2d 425 
(Utah 1995) (holding that party was not barred by res judicata when in prior action it 
relied on opponent's representations that if true would have made further litigation 
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unnecessary). Images' transfer of its multilevel marketing business and all other 
tangible assets on the eve of the first trial setting in the Images action to Neways, which 
was only recently formed by Images' insiders, was the reason that Macris' recovery was 
limited. Furthermore, during the Images action, every effort was made to separate 
Neways from Images. Thus, Macris was "prevented from exhibiting fully [its] case, by 
fraud or deception practiced on [it] by" Neways and the Mowers. Pepper, 801 P.2d at 
148-49. 
This Court has allowed parties to maintain a second action to seek the same 
relief they sought in a prior action. Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 509 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In Masters, the first action was a divorce proceeding in which Masters, 
despite his efforts to avoid it, was ordered to pay child support for three children born 
during his marriage to Worsley. k l at 500. In a later action, Masters alleged that the 
child support obligations ordered by the first court were induced by fraud committed by 
Worsely during the first action. Masters therefore sought rescission of his child support 
obligations, id. Despite the fact that Masters' objective in the second action was the 
same as his objective in the first, to avoid the obligation of child support, this Court held 
that res judicata was inapplicable. i<l at 509. 
Neways and the Mowers' reliance on Reed v. Marketing Services International, 
Ltd., 540 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Tex. 1982), to support their argument is misplaced. 
Neways and the Mowers argue that this case stands for the proposition that where two 
lawsuits seek the same damages, the second is barred by res judicata. (Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 16-17.) This case says no such thing. The court dismissed the second 
suit because "the acts complained of, the complaints filed and the evidence to be 
adduced in this action are identical to the acts complained of, the complaints filed and 
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the evidence adduced in the [prior] action." Reed, 540 F. Supp. at 898. Moreover, the 
court found that the relief the plaintiffs sought in the second action was the only thing 
different from the prior action: "In essence, the only substantial difference in the 
present suit is the remedies sought." \± 
2. The Evidence that Will Be Used to Prove Damages in the Neways 
Action Had Never Been Introduced in the Images Action. 
In arguing that the claims in this action are the same as the claims in the Images 
action, Neways and the Mowers rely heavily on their contention that evidence that 
Macris will use to prove damages in this action is the same evidence it used to recover 
damages in the Images action. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, 10, 14, 17.) Neways and 
the Mowers are wrong. In the Images action, Macris recovered damages incurred 
through August 31, 1992, because on September 1, 1992, Neways succeeded to the 
multilevel marketing business. (R. at 250.) Evidence from the Images action of Macris1 
damages through August 31, 1992, will not be used in the Neways action for three 
reasons. First, no evidence was used in the Images action to prove damages. Images 
stipulated to the amounts awarded as damages. (R. at 249-50.) 
Second, even if evidence had been used to prove damages through August 31, 
1992, such evidence need not be used in the Neways action. Neways is liable for such 
damages because it is the successor, alter ego and fraudulent transferee of Images. 
Evidence that Neways is the successor, fraudulent transferee and alter ego and of the 
judgment in the Images action is all that Macris need introduce to obtain the amount of 
its judgment from Neways. This is illustrated by the trial court's partial grant of Macris' 
motion for summary judgment on its successor liability claim. (R. at 425-27.) 
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Third, Maoris' remaining damages will be proven with different evidence than the 
evidence that would have been used in the Images action had Images not stipulated to 
the damages amount. For instance, the pertinent time period will be after August 31, 
1992, rather than before that time. Also, the pertinent amounts will be different 
because Maoris' damages are partially based on the profits of Neways' monthly sales. 
Thus, it is not true that evidence needed to prove damages in the Neways action was 
used in the Images action. 
Even if evidence of damages would be used again in the Neways action, that is 
no ground to find that Macris* claims in this action are the same as its breach of contract 
claims in the Images action. The evidence used to prove liability will be wholly different. 
The evidence of liability in the Images action focused on the 1989 formation and 
Images' 1991 breach of the Autoqualification Agreement. In this action, the evidence of 
liability will focus on the formation of Neways, the relationship between Neways and 
Images, and the circumstances surrounding Images' transfer of its assets, including the 
multilevel marketing business, to Neways. 
3. Macris Did Not Have an Opportunity to Recover on Its Fraudulent 
Transfer, Successor Liability and Alter Ego Claims in the Images 
Action. 
After endeavoring to deprive Macris of a full and fair opportunity to litigate its 
claims during the Images action through a corporate shell game, Neways and the 
Mowers callously argue that Macris had a full and fair opportunity in that action to assert 
all of its claims and recover all of its damages. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, 8, 15, 17.) 
The very basis for this action is Neways and the Mowers' fraudulent acts which they 
perpetrated to evade and defeat Macris' valid claims and judgment. If given the 
opportunity to prove their claims, Macris would thereby show that it was deprived a fair 
17 
opportunity to fully recover its damages. 
In addition, an indispensable party to Maoris' current claims was not present in 
the Images action. To prevail on its fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego 
claims, Macris has to assert them against the transferee, the successor and the alter 
ego, Neways. 
Neways and the Mowers admitted in this case that Macris could not have 
brought its current claims during the Images action. In their first response to Macris' 
Complaint in this action, their Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings, 
Neways and the Mowers argued that Macris' claims against them were "Not Ripe for 
Decision and Therefor [sic] Should be Dismissed." (R. at 34 (emphasis in original).) 
Neways and the Mowers argued: 
In the case at bar, [Macris'] claims for Fraudulent Transfer, 
Successor Liability and Alter Ego turn first upon a finding that 
[Images] has a liability to [Macris]. Since the determination has 
not been made, the claims asserted herein have not sharpened 
into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations 
between the parties and as such, the hypothetical application of [a 
rule of law] to a situation in which the parties might, at some future 
time, find themselves is unripe for adjudication under the ripeness 
doctrine. . . . 
Further, continuation of this lawsuit, prior to a final 
determination of liability in [the Images action] would waste judicial 
resources as well as subject the parties to unnecessary litigation 
expenses. 
(R. at 34 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).) 
In their Reply Brief, Neways and the Mowers attempt to recant this prior position 
by asserting that they withdrew their motion because, "after comparing the facts to Utah 
law, it was clear that res judicata did in fact bar the second lawsuit." (Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 3 n.2.) This is nothing more than unsubstantiated revisionism. Neways 
and the Mowers withdrew their motion because the basis for it—that a final 
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determination of the Images action had not yet occurred-disappeared. On June 6, 
1995, the trial court in the Images action issued its Memorandum Decision, ruling in 
favor of Macris. (R. at 134.) On July 10, 1995, Neways and the Mowers withdrew their 
motion. (R. at 61.) Moreover, Neways and the Mowers later admitted that "Judge 
Burningham's Memorandum Decision [in the Images action] rendered Defendants' 
Motion moot." (R. at 134.) 
4. The Record Does Not Support Neways and the Mowers' Argument 
that Macris Had Full Knowledge of Its Current Claims in Time to 
Assert Them in the Images Action, 
In their attempt to show that Macris' current claims are the same as those in the 
Images action, Neways and the Mowers repeatedly argue that Macris had full 
knowledge of its current claims during the Images action. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 
12, 15, 16.) The record, however, reveals that the earliest Macris had knowledge of the 
facts underlying its claim was only shortly before the trial in the Images action when it 
filed its Complaint in the Neways action. The record reveals that during the Images 
action, Images and Thomas Mower tried to separate Images from Neways. (R. at 262.) 
Furthermore, as stated above, Neways and the Mowers' contention that Macris' counsel 
reviewed Neways' financial documents is unsupported and contradicted by the record 
which discloses that Macris was allowed access only to financial information showing 
sales figures through August 31, 1992. (R. at 262.) Arguments unsupported by the 
record must not be considered. Uckerman, 588 P.2d at 144. Furthermore, all facts and 
inferences must be viewed in Macris' favor. Masters, 777 P.2d at 501. 
In addition, Neways and the Mowers' argument regarding Macris' alleged 
knowledge of its current claims is irrelevant. As Neways and the Mowers now 
acknowledge, "even if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis for a suit at the filing of 
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another suit, he or she is not obligated to bring all claims together if they do not arise 
out of the same transaction." Macko v. Byron, 555 F. Supp. 470, 479 (N.D. Ohio 1982); 
(Reply Brief of Appellant at 9.) Thus, Neways and the Mowers' argument regarding 
Macris' alleged knowledge begs the question of whether its claims in this action are the 
same as those in the Images action. 
D. MACRIS WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT TO ASSERT 
ITS CURRENT CLAIMS. 
As Neways and the Mowers admit, to prevail on their res judicata defense, they 
must, in addition to satisfying the identity of parties and claims requirements, show that 
Macris' current claims are ones that could and should have been brought in the Images 
action. (Reply Brief of Appellant at 9.) Most courts and commentators hold that for a 
claim to be barred, it must have arisen at the time the first suit was commenced or 
asserted in a pleading. (See authorities cited on page 27 of the Brief of Cross-
Appellant Macris & Associates, Inc.) Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
echoes this near universal principle. 
Neways and the Mowers disregard the majority rule and Rule 13(a) to argue that 
Macris had a duty to amend. Such a rule, however, would lead to disruption and 
confusion. As stated in Whitley Construction Co. v. Whitley. 213 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1975), "[t]he fact that [procedural rules] contain[ ] liberal provisions making it 
possible to amend the pleadings during the course of the trial [does] not require the 
plaintiff to so amend in every case in which he might amend . . . . It is more practicable 
to have a certain cut off time. . . ." (Emphasis in original.) 
The question becomes what should be the "cutoff time"? Obviously, a claim 
arising after judgment was entered could not possibly have been raised and therefore is 
not barred. Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
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(holding that claim arising "well after the completion of the prior action . . . was not 'ripe 
for adjudication.").3 
The commencement of trial might seem a tempting cut-off point. The problem 
with this standard is that a new claim cannot simply be added and tried in all 
circumstances. "[I]t must be remembered that [adding a claim] requires the requisite 
proof, which in many cases might be somewhat complicated . . . ." Whitley Constr., 213 
S.E.2d at 911. Also, the closer to trial, the less likely it is that a court would grant 
permission for an amendment. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); 
Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, denied. 862 P.2d 1756 (Utah 1993). 
The majority of cases therefore hold that claims arising after the commencement 
of an action need not be asserted or lost to the preclusive effect of res judicata. (See 
authorities cited at page 27 of the Brief of Cross-Appellant Macris & Associates, Inc.) In 
its opening brief, Macris stated that an appropriate cut-off point could also be the 
claimant's last pleading in the earlier suit. Obviously, such a pleading would have to be 
one in which the claimant could have asserted claims. The purpose of establishing a 
point in litigation after which newly arisen, similar claims need not be joined is to select 
a time at which accrued claims could and should be asserted. It would make no sense 
to select a point in litigation at which claims could not have been readily asserted. This 
is what Macris intended in its opening brief. Indeed, the record on appeal contains no 
pleading filed by Macris in the Images action after its June 9, 1992 Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. at 192, 203.) 
3
 Neways and the Mowers argue that this case imposes a duty to amend on parties discovering additional, 
similar claims before judgment. Such a reading is impossible. In Josephson, this Court found res judicata 
inapplicable. Josephson, 888 P.2d at 678. Furthermore, the Court did not speculate on what the result 
would be if the claim had arisen before the judgment in the first suit. 
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Neways and the Mowers argue that the filing of the last pleading in which a party 
could not have asserted claims is an appropriate cutoff point for res judicata purposes. 
(Reply Brief of Appellant at 21-22.) Specifically, Neways and the Mowers argue that 
Macris filed a pleading, a reply to Images' amended counterclaim,4 on August 23, 1993, 
and that because Images' fraudulent transfer to Neways occurred on September 1, 
1992, Macris could and should have asserted its current claims. (kiL at 2, 21-22.) First, 
as discussed above, the record offers no support for the contention that any pleadings, 
much less a pleading by Macris, were filed in the Images action after September 1, 
1992. In any event, a plaintiffs reply to a counterclaim, contrary to Neways and the 
Mowers' insinuations throughout their Reply Brief, does not offer a party an opportunity 
to investigate and assert claims. For this reason, no court or commentator has 
advanced the time at which a reply to a counterclaim or similar responsive pleading is 
filed as an appropriate point in litigation before which arisen claims will be barred by res 
judicata and after which they will not. Therefore, even if this Court could consider 
Macris' alleged reply to amended counterclaim, it should not because it is entirely 
irrelevant to the question of whether Macris' current claims could and should have been 
asserted in the Images action. 
Neways and the Mowers also argue that Macris had a duty to amend their 
complaint in the Images action to assert their current claims, irrespective of whether 
such claims arose before or after Macris' pleadings. Cases on which Neways and the 
Mowers rely, however, do not support their contention. First, Neways and the Mowers 
4
 On page 22 of their Reply Brief, Neways and the Mowers described Macris' pleading as "an Amended 
Counterclaim and Answer to Third Party Complaint." Neways and the Mowers have admitted that this was 
a typographical error and the pleading they allege Macris filed is a Reply to Amended Counterclaim and 
Answer to Third Party Complaint. (Reply Memorandum to Neways' Motion to Supplement Record and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Macris' Motion to Strike the Addendum and Portions of the Reply Brief of 
Appellants at 2 n.1.) 
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distort the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Badger v. Badger, 254 P. 784 (Utah 1927). 
This case actually supports the majority rule that claims arising after the 
commencement of an action are not precluded by res judicata. (See Brief of Cross-
Appellant at 28-29.) In apparent recognition of Badger v. Badger's support for the 
majority rule, Neways and the Mowers resort to mischaracterizing that decision with 
their argument that the court favored amendments to include new claims because it 
"explicitly held that if new facts had surfaced during the first petition, plaintiff 'would 
have been granted leave to amend.'" (Reply Brief of Appellant at 20 (quoting Badger 
254 P. at 788.) The court made no such holding. Neways and the Mowers improperly 
take the quoted portion of Badger completely out of context. In stating that leave to 
amend would have been granted, the court was not referring to the appellant's first 
petition to modify a divorce decree, but was instead referring to the later petition that 
was stricken on grounds of res judicata. JdL at 788. The court's discussion was 
directed to the issue of "whether or not the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
striking the amended [second] petition," not whether the appellant could and should 
have asserted additional facts in her first petition for modification of the divorce decree. 
\± 
Neways also improperly relies on Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 512 
F.2d 1082 (Ct. CI. 1975), Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1986), and O'Shea 
v.Amoco Oil Co.. 886 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1989). (Reply Brief of Appellant at 12, 18-19.) 
The Everett Plywood court refused to apply the rule advanced by Neways and the 
Mowers and instead applied the rule that claims arising after the commencement of the 
first action are not barred by res judicata: 
23 
a separate action founded on a single nondivisible contract may 
be maintained if the later claim is severable from the earlier one, 
and, if at the time of the commencement of the earlier suit, the 
later claim was not then capable of being asserted. 
Everett Plywood Corp.. 512 F.2d at 1087, 1088 (emphasis added). Harnett is also 
unavailing to Neways and the Mowers because claims that were barred by res judicata 
arose before commencement of the first action. Harnett. 800 F.2d at 1310-11, 1314, 
1315. 
Neways and the Mowers represent that O'Shea v. Amoco Oil Co., 886 F.2d 584 
(3d Cir. 1989), holds that because M[t]he plaintiff did not plead 'all related claims,' 
including those that became ripe only two months before trial in the first action, res 
judicata barred the second suit." (Reply Brief at 12.) Neways and the Mowers, 
however, completely distort the facts and result of this case. In O'Shea, the plaintiff and 
defendant entered into a franchise contract which required plaintiff to operate a 
franchise 24 hours a day. O'Shea, 886 F.2d at 586. In the first action, plaintiff sued the 
defendant claiming that the 24-hour requirement was unreasonable under state 
common law. JcL at 587. Contrary to Neways and the Mowers' assertion, the plaintiff 
did not prevail in the first action, j d In the second action, plaintiff again claimed that 
the 24-hour requirement was unreasonable, but this time asserted the New Jersey 
Franchise Practices Act ("NJFPA") \_± at 589. It is true that two months before trial in 
the first action, defendant terminated the franchise agreement. icL at 587. Contrary to 
Neways and the Mowers' contentions, however, this termination had no bearing on the 
plaintiffs NJFPA claim. The NJFPA claim was the same as plaintiffs claim under 
common law in the first action. In fact, the court specifically held that the plaintiffs 
"NJFPA claim that the 24-hour provision was unenforceable as a matter of state law 
clearly arose before his state court litigation. Indeed, [there is] no reason why [the 
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plaintiff] could not have brought his NJFPA claim at the inception of his state court suit." 
Id. at 591. Thus, despite Neways and the Mowers' misstatements, the O'Shea court did 
not dismiss on res judicata grounds claims that "became ripe only two months before 
trial." (Reply Brief of Appellant at 12.) 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Neways 
and the Mowers and affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Macris. This 
Court should also reverse the trial court's decision to deny Macris' motion for summary 
judgment to the extent it ruled that res judicata limits Neways' successor liability to the 
judgment entered in the Images action. 
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